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Federal Home Loan Bank Lending to Community Banks:
Are Targeted Subsidies Necessary?
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 brought about sweeping changes to
the financial system.
1 Also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GBLA), this statute
represents the single most important set of regulatory reforms since the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933. The GBLA repeals many of the provisions of the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding
Company Acts that prohibit or limit the affiliation of banks with other nondepository financial
firms. Ironically, while the spirit of GBLA is consistent with efforts to reduce financial-market
distortions caused by government intervention, the legislation introduces a new distortion into
financial markets by permitting Federal Home Loan Banks to lend to community financial
institutions.
2
Title VI, Section 604, of the GBLA amends the Federal Home Loan Bank Act to extend
the lending authority of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). The amendment allows the
FHLBs to make advances secured by the small business and small agricultural loans of
community financial institutions. This new FHLB lending power means that community banks
and thrifts can now fund loans to small businesses and agricultural concerns with something
other than deposits. By providing community financial institutions with a subsidized source of
funds, Congress sought to encourage increased lending to small enterprises.
Unfortunately, selective credit subsidies have proven to be inefficient tools for
promoting a financial activity, such as small business lending, or a particular set of firms – such
as community financial institutions. Moreover, there is a wide literature (see for example, Kane
[1970, 1977]) that shows how this type of government intervention distorts private incentives.
These distortions in incentives result in unintended effects of the policy that reduce the
effectiveness of the intervention – even make it counterproductive – while increasing its cost.
The GLBA extension of FHLB lending powers is likely to increase taxpayer exposure to bank
losses, misallocate funds that may be more efficiently used elsewhere and unnecessarily transfer
wealth from depositors and taxpayers to the owners of community financial institutions, FHLBs,
                                                          
1 Public Law 106-102.
2 Section 602 of the GLBA amended section 2 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, defining a “community
financial institution” as follows: “The term ‘community financial institution’ means that the financial
institutions has deposits insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and has, as of the date of the
transaction at issue, less than $500,000,000 in average total assets, based on an average of total assets over
the 3 years preceding that date.” Ibid, footnote 1.2
and small enterprises. If this wealth transfer is truly the purpose of the act  then classic economic
welfare arguments suggest a more efficient direct cash subsidy.
In this paper we examine whether we need to subsidize the funding of the small
enterprise loan portfolios of community financial institutions. We speculate that in extending the
FHLBs’ lending authority, Congress intended to address one of three possible problems. Then,
we investigate whether these problems are real or not. Section I describes the possible scenarios.
Congress may have thought that the FHLBs needed a new role in financial markets to ensure
their survival.  Perhaps they perceive that community financial institutions need subsidies to stay
afloat. A third possibility is that legislators may have believed that small business and
agricultural lending in rural areas would suffer without Congressional support. We present
evidence against the use of selective credit subsidies to ensure the viability of the FHLBs or
community banks. We argue that even if these perceived needs are real, there are alternative
policies for addressing them that dominate this form of intervention. The remainder of our
analysis focuses on refuting the hypothesis that community financial institutions need more funds
to increase their rural small business lending. Specifically, we empirically investigate whether
funding constraints affect the lending decision at community banks. In section II, we describe our
data, including summary statistics, and outline our empirical strategy. The empirical results are
presented in section III. Overall, the empirical evidence demonstrates that funding does not
constrain rural small business lending, so the FHLB lending provisions of the Act will have no
beneficial effect on such lending. Conclusions and policy implications are in section IV.
I.  What Was Congress Thinking?
The existence of financial intermediaries tells us that the perfect capital market
assumptions that underpin the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance of the form of capital does not hold.
For policymakers, the question is not whether financial markets (money, capital, and payments
markets) are frictionless. Rather, the question is, do the private sector institutions that arise to
mitigate (or arbitrage away) market frictions serve to complete the markets? If not, then public
intervention in markets may be required. In this case, we are interested in the objectives
underlying the use of an existing government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) to subsidize the
funding of community financial institution’s small business loans. Moreover, we are interested in
whether or not extending FHLB lending authority is the most effective intervention for achieving
these objectives.3
One possible motivation for the GBLA small business lending provisions is the desire of
Congress to subsidize the activities of community financial institutions. Subsidization of these
“asset-challenged” depository institutions might be warranted if the social benefits associated
with their operation exceeded the private benefits. However, for our purposes the point is not
whether subsidies to community financial institutions are necessary, but rather given if Congress
has decided to subsidize these depositories, is the method undertaken in GBLA the best one from
the standpoint of social welfare?
By allowing community financial institutions to pledge small enterprise loans as
collateral for FHLB advances, the GBLA is engaging in selective credit allocation. From Kane
(1977), we know that selective credit allocation is an inefficient and often counterproductive
policy tool. In the case of community financial institutions, the provision of subsidies tied to
small enterprise lending is likely to have costly unintended effects. For one, if community
financial institutions are not funding-constrained then this subsidy tied to small-enterprise
lending is not likely to increase the amount of credit extended. However, the ability to substitute
FHLB advances for deposits to fund existing small-enterprise loans increases the deposit-market
power of community banks and thrifts – to the detriment of depositors, in particular small savers.
To the extent that access to additional funds through the FHLB stimulates additional lending by
community depositories, the new credits are likely to carry higher default risk than those already
in the portfolio.  Moreover, given the limited geographic scope of community banks and thrifts
these new credits are likely to be highly correlated with the institution’s existing loan portfolio.
3
In other words, at the macroeconomic level, this form of selective credit allocation may result in
an overinvestment in risky assets in the economy, and at the institution-level, increases the
probability of failure and expected losses to uninsured claimants and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
Indeed, if Congress wants to ensure the viability of community financial institutions,
there are more economically efficient methods for doing this. For example, the Congress could
extend to all community financial institutions the tax-benefits associated with being organized as
a subchapter S corporation.
4 Moreover, Congress could reduce the regulatory burden of these
community depositories by exempting them from the Community Reinvestment Act and other
consumer regulations where the fixed costs of compliance, such as reporting requirements, are
high.
                                                          
3 See Flannery (1989) for an alternative explanation.4
A second rationale for the GLBA amendments to FHLB lending authority is a desire to
ensure the continued viability of the Federal Home Loan Banks by providing them with an
additional role in financial markets. The FHLBs were originally part of an institutional structure
set up to promote housing finance, which included a separately chartered set of depository
institutions and savings associations, as lenders.
 5 Like all government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), the FHLBs represent an indirect government intervention, in part because the chartering
of a GSE to carry out a particular public mission requires an act of Congress.
Why should Congress be concerned about the survival of a GSE? After all, the
justification for chartering a GSE is to perform a needed market-completion service not being
provided by private intermediaries. The fact that a GSE is no longer viable may indicate that it is
no longer needed to carry out that function, or it may be a signal that flaws in its design keep it
from performing the needed role.  In the first case, markets may have developed to the degree
that continued government intervention is no longer needed.  In the second case, government
intervention is still required, but the existing method of intervention needs to be replaced with
one that performs the needed function.  In either of these two cases, social welfare would be
enhanced by the orderly exit of this government-subsidized competitor from financial markets. If
indeed the existence of the FHLBs is in question, it is because of dramatic changes in financial
markets since the 1930s. In particular, the increased efficiency of housing-finance markets in the
United States has reduced (if not eliminated) the need for direct and indirect government
intervention to support this market, including the traditional functions performed by the FHLBs.
6
Given the lessons of the thrift debacle, it is not surprising that Congress would be
concerned when the survival of one of these financial institutions comes into question. The cost
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 See Harvey and Padget (2000).
5 Two pieces of legislation, the Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the National Housing Act of 1934,
established the foundation of federal policy for housing finance and the infrastructure for promoting and
regulating the housing finance industry – the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
 At inception, the Federal
Home Loan Bank System consisted of 12 Banks (similar in charter and organization to the 12 Federal
Reserve Banks), the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (similar to the FDIC), the Home
Owners Loan Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (analogous to the Federal Reserve Board)
to oversee the System, and charter federal savings and loans (equivalent to the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency).  The Federal Home Loan Bank Board and its successor the Federal Housing Finance Board
would include all Federal Home Loan Bank member institutions in the definition of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System.  For a contemporary discussion of the Federal Home Loan Bank System and its mandate to
promote housing, see McDonough (1934).
6 Laderman and Passmore (2000) raise questions as to the need a separate thrift charter to promote housing
finance.  Moreover, recent research by Heuson, Passmore and Sparks (2000) calls into question whether
mortgage securitization – done large by GSEs – has resulted in lower mortgage rates.  These authors find
that the causation runs from lower mortgage rates to securitization and not the other way around5
associated with deviations of GSEs from their original mission is a major policy concern. After
all the goals of GSEs, such as the FHL Banks, are muddled when the interests of their
shareholders are not closely aligned with the mission associated with the enterprises’ public
charter. To the extent that public and private interests diverge, GSEs are prone to “mission
creep” – a subtle shift away from their original mandate. Mission creep can lead to undesirable
distortions in financial markets, including resource misallocations and increased taxpayer
exposure potential losses associated with the activities of these GSEs. Unchecked by well-
defined legislative limits on GSE activities, mission creep coupled with competitive advantages
associated with theirpublic charter could enable these firms to dominate their markets at the
expense of their private competitors.
7
 One lesson from the 1980s thrift debacle is that the moral-hazard problems associated
with government-subsidized funding of a financial institution increase dramatically as it comes
under financial distress.
8  In the case of a GSE, timely action by the Congress may be needed to
contain the potential losses to taxpayers and the deadweight losses to the economy associated
with the ‘gambling for resurrection strategies’ that ensue. There are, however, two alternatives to
expanding the FHLBs franchise that would have addressed concerns Congress may have had
about the increasing moral hazard incentives faced by the FHLB’s. The first alternative would be
legislation that mandated an orderly withdrawal of the FHLBs from markets and liquidation of
their remaining assets. A second alternative would be a full privatization of the FHLBs.
Privatization would include an explicit withdrawal of government subsidies to the Federal Home
Loan Banks and the phasing out of restrictions on their activities.
9 It is notable that privatization
was the route taken by Sallie Mae.
10 Both of these alternatives would reduce the distortions
associated with government intervention in markets, while the latter would allow for a role for
the FHLBs in those financial markets in which they are competitive.
                                                          
7 For example, as Maloney and Thomson (2001) point out, it is difficult to reconcile the FHLBs’ large
investment in mortgage-backed securities issued by other GSEs with the FHLBs’ mission.  In effect, the
leveraging of the implicit government guarantees of the FHLBs’ consolidated obligation bonds – bonds
issued on behalf of the 12 FHL Banks collectively – to invest in marketable securities is analogous to the
FHLBs operating a government subsidized hedge fund.
8 See Kane (1989).
9. The idea that a GSE should be privatized once its mission has been achieved is not new.
As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Darcey Bradbury (1995) notes, “The
Treasury has for a number of years, in Democratic and Republican Administrations, believed
that it is appropriate to wean a GSE from Federal sponsorship once the GSE becomes
economically viable and successfully fulfills the purpose for which it was created with
Federal sponsorship, or when the purpose for which it was created ceases to exist.”
10 See the Student Loan Marketing Association (1996).6
Ensuring that adequate funds are available to small businesses and family farms
represents a third possible rationale for the GLBA extension of the FHLBs’ lending authority (to
include advances secured by the small enterprise loans of community banks and thrifts). Why
would Congress extend another subsidy to support lending to sectors of the economy for which
there is already a litany of programs – such as the Small Business Administration’s loan
guarantee program for small business loans and the Farm Credit Banks in agriculture – designed
to do that? One possible answer lies in work by Peterson and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell
(1995) on the importance of banking relationships in the small business loan market.
11 This work
suggests that existing programs to support lending to small enterprises, and in particular small
businesses, rely heavily on the ability of community banks to fund new loans. This would be
especially true in rural markets where community banks are likely to be the main source of
credit. Therefore, if community banks are funding-constrained then a number of profitable loans
would not be funded, irrespective of existing loan-guarantee programs. In this case, government
intervention, such as the GLBA amendments to FHLB lending authority, might be justified
because of the deadweight losses associated with not funding all positive-net-present-value
projects in the economy.
To the extent that community banks are not funding-constrained, this new source of
funding tied to small enterprise loans is not likely to increase funds available to small businesses.
In this case, FHLB advances secured by small business and small agricultural credits will be used
to replace deposits, increasing whatever market power community banks in non-urban markets
have. Neumark and Sharp (1992) document an asymmetric response of consumer deposit rates to
changes in market interest rates – deposit rates follow market rates up with a lag, but closely
follow market rates down. Hence, an unintended consequence of the Act’s FHLB lending
provisions could be a wealth transfer from small savers to the owners of community banks and
thrifts.
Whether FHLB advances are likely to lead to increased small business lending by
community financial institutions or will be used for other purposes – such as deposit replacement
or for alternative funding opportunities – is an empirical issue, which we address in this paper.
To do this we focus on the small-business lending activities of community banks, particularly
those headquartered in  non-MSA counties, and test the following hypothesis:
                                                          
11 Kane and Malkiel (1965) provide an early analysis of the importance of relationships in business lending.7
H0: Increasing community-bank access to funds will significantly increase their small-
business lending.
II. The Sample and Empirical Method
The sample consists of balance-sheet and income-statement data for FDIC-insured banks
from 1993 through 1999 from the June Federal Financial Institution Reports of Income and
Condition (call reports). The sample is limited to the June call reports because that is the only
quarter small business loan data is reported, starting June 1993. In addition, we collected data
from the FDIC’s annual Summary of Deposit Data filed each June. Finally, we include
economic-conditions data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. These data were aggregated from county and MSA statistics on unemployment rates,
population and income collected for each calendar year.
In this paper, the analysis concentrates on small business lending by community banks
for two reasons. First, focusing on small business loans captures the credit sector that the act is
intended to subsidize more exactly.
12 Second, commercial lending by thrift institutions is
constrained by other limits legislated by Congress. 
13
To test our null hypothesis we construct a regression system of equations where deposits
and small-business loans are assumed to be endogenous.  If the effect of deposits (once the
endogeneity of the variable is taken into account) on small-business loans is positive, then this
would indicate that the banks are funding constrained and would support the hypothesis, Ho. A
first set of equations relates the portfolio share of small-business loans to proxy variables from
the balance sheet designed to capture sources of funds for small-business loans and competing
uses, as well as variables to control for market structure and various fixed effects related to
economic conditions in the bank’s market. The model is:
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12 We also limit the sample to small business loans because of concerns about the quality of the small
agricultural loan data on the call reports.  In addition, preliminary work using the small agricultural loan
data calls into question whether it is appropriate to pool these credits with the small business loans.
13 The acts include the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, and the qualified thrift lender test in the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987 as amended by the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction8
where, DEPAt and SBLAt are the deposits to assets and small-business-loans to assets ratios,
respectively, BSj is the j
th variable constructed from balance sheet data, MSj is the j
th market
structure proxy, and ECj is the j
th economic conditions variable included to control for the
economic environment. Four balance-sheet variables are included in equation (1). The natural log
of total assets scaled by total assets is included as a regressor to control for the correlation
between the size of a bank and its reliance on deposits.
14  We include the capital-to-asset ratio
because it represents an alternative funding source and to control for the possible influence of
capital regulation. Federal funds purchased to assets and other borrowed money to assets are
included in the deposit equation because they represent alternative funding sources, ones that at
the margin might be less expensive than raising additional deposits. To control for the impact of
market structure we include the bank’s market share of deposits in its home market, a dummy
variable equal to one if the bank is headquartered in a rural county, and the total number of
branches. Finally, for a bank’s primary market we include the unemployment rate, population
growth, and the natural log of per capita income to control for the economic environment.
The primary regressor of interest in (2) is the endogenous deposit-to-asset ratio.  For the
null hypothesis, H0, that the community-bank lending market is constrained by a lack of funds, to
hold, the estimated coefficient on this variable, λ1, needs to be positive and significant. However,
we include a number of other balance-sheet proxy variables to capture the effects of other bank
asset and liability decisions that impact the size of the small business loan portfolio. As in
equation (1), we include the natural-log-of-assets-to- assets ratio and the capital-to-assets ratio to
control for the impact of size and capital on small-business lending.  We also include three
variables, which represent competing uses of funds:  large business loans to assets, securities to
assets, and federal funds sold to assets.  To control for market structure we include the number of
branches, a non-MSA dummy (equal to one if the bank is headquartered in a non-MSA county)
and the deposit Herfindahl index for the market where the bank is headquartered.  Finally, the
lending opportunity faced by the bank is controlled for the inclusion of the same economics
conditions variables as equation (1).
Some care needs to be exercised in interpreting coefficients in static portfolio-share
regressions.  Equations (1) and (2) provide us with an understanding of how funding and other
asset decisions, given market structure and economic conditions, determine the share of assets
                                                                                                                                                                            
Act of 1996.  The 1996 legislation complicates the analysis of the determinants of thrift-small business
lending by allowing such credits to be counted without limit towards meeting the qualified thrift lender test.9
invested in small-business loans.  While this framework provides us with insight as to the
importance of funding constraints, it does not allow us to test directly whether additional small-
business lending is conditioned by the ability of the bank to raise additional funds.  To do this we
propose a second system of equations that looks at the year-to-year change in deposits and small
business loans.
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Equations (3) and (4) are essentially our first system with the portfolio-share variables replaced
by logarithmic changes in the underlying asset or liability category.  Thus ∆LNSBL, ∆LNDEP,
and ∆LNBSjs represent changes in the natural logarithm of levels of small-business loans,
deposits and balance-sheet variables from time t-1 to t.
15 In addition, the market-structure
variables are lagged one period to control for the effect of existing economic structure on these
changes in the deposits and small business loans.  The list of the variables in equations (3) and
(4) along with their definitions is presented in table 1.  As before, the focus of these regressions
is on the small-business lending equation, and the deposit equation and small-business lending
equations are jointly estimated in a system where the change in deposits and change in small
business loans are assumed endogenous.  If the null hypothesis of community-bank small-
business lending being funding-constrained is true, we expect the estimated coefficient on the
change in deposits, λ1, to be positive and significant.
III. The Empirical Results
System in Levels
Our first system in levels represented by equations (1) and (2) are estimated over the
entire sample of banks and six  subsamples:  all banks in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs),
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 Other specifications for this size proxy were used such as the natural log of total assets (unscaled).  Our
results were not sensitive to the specification of this variable.
15 To preserve observations with a value of zero we add one to all observations prior to taking the natural
logarithm.10
all banks in non-MSAs, community banks in MSAs, community banks in non-MSAs, large banks
in MSAs, and large banks in non-MSAs.
16 Given that we are interested in the GBLA provision
that allows FHLBs to lend against the small-business loan portfolios community banks, we focus
our discussion on the community-bank regressions, especially for the non-MSA sample.
17
Table 2 presents the results for equations (1) and (2) over the sample of directly
impacted by the new FHLB lending authority – banks with assets less than $500 million.  Table 2
reports the results for the model estimated over the MSA community bank (under $500 million in
assets) and non-MSA county community bank samples.  We report the results for the ‘all banks
under $500 million in assets’ sample because, for equation 2, the data reject the pooling of the
‘banks in non-MSAs under $500 million in assets’ with ‘banks in MSAs under $500 million in
assets’ at the 1 percent level.
18
The top panel in table 2 presents the results for equation (1).  As expected, the
coefficients of the capital asset ratio, the federal-funds-purchased ratio and the other-borrowed-
money ratio are negative and significant, indicating that reliance on deposits as a source of funds
is inversely related to the use of other funding sources.  However, for community banks, whether
MSA or rural, the main alternative to deposit funding appears to be capital. The significantly
positive coefficient on the natural-log-of-total-assets-to-total-assets ratio suggests that for
community banks, size has a significantly negative impact on the proportion of assets funded by
deposits.  As expected, the effect of the number of bank branches is positively and significantly
related to the reliance of community banks on deposits to fund assets.  The reliance of city
community banks on deposit funding is significantly positively related to their share of deposits
in their home market.  This is in contrast to an insignificant effect of the market share on deposits
for non-MSA community banks.  Finally, the significance of the economics conditions variables
in all the subsamples illustrates the importance of controlling for these effects in this regression
system.
The results for equation (2) are presented in the lower panel of table 2.  Under the null
hypothesis, the coefficient on the deposits-to-assets ratio is expected to be positive and
                                                          
16 All equations are estimated using SAS version 8.0.
17 We also estimated a version of the model where small business loans to assets is replaced by total loans to
assets as the dependent variable in equation (2) and dropping the LBLOANA variable as a regressor.
18 The community banks in rural areas sample conforms most closely under the null hypothesis to those
banks that the GBLA is targeting.   Therefore, we also test for differences across our sample of rural banks.
For equation 2 the data  reject the pooling of the non-MSA community bank sample with the sample of
‘banks in non-MSAs with assets greater than $500 million’ at the 1 percent level.11
significant.  We find a positive and significant relationship between small business loans, as a
share of assets, and deposits to assets in the ‘MSA banks less than $500 million’ sample.
However, for the rural community bank sample the coefficient on the deposit variable is negative
and significant.  This result for rural community banks is not consistent with a null hypothesis of
a community-bank lending market that is constrained by a lack of deposits.  Not surprisingly, the
data reject the equality of the coefficients on the deposit-to-asset ratios across the MSA and non-
MSA community bank samples.  The negative and significant coefficient on the capital-to-assets
ratio for non-MSA banks in table 2 suggests that rules limiting the percentage of capital a bank
can be exposed to any single borrower may be binding for rural community banks.  In other
words, banks with higher capital-per-dollar-of-assets are able to make larger loans to profitable
customers and hence, fewer loans that would be classified as small business loans.
Alternative lending and investment opportunities – large business loans to assets,
securities to assets, and federal funds sold to assets – capture the effect of other uses of funds on
the small-business-loan portfolio.  All three of our proxies for other uses of funds are negative
and significant, as expected.  It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficients for the non-
MSA community-bank subsample are significantly smaller than for the MSA community-bank
subsample.  The smaller effect of the alternative lending and investment opportunities on the
small-business-loans-to-assets ratio for rural community banks is consistent with these banks’
having fewer available profitable lending opportunities.  This result is also not consistent with
the null hypothesis.
The coefficient on the natural-log-of-assets-to-assets ratio is negative and significant in
both samples.  Note, scaling the natural of assets by total assets makes this regressor inversely
related to size and hence, larger community banks have a higher percentage of assets in loans
including small-business loans, although the effect of size on small business lending is
significantly higher for urban community banks than rural ones – presumably reflecting a better
lending environment for urban banks.  For rural community banks an increase in the number of
branches significantly increases the share small business loans in the portfolio.  Somewhat
surprising, however, is the negative and significant coefficient on the number of branches for
urban community banks.  To the extent that small-business lending is relationship lending than
we would expect a positive relationship between the number of branches and the proportion of
small business loans held by a bank.12
Market concentration, as captured by the deposit Herfindahl, is negatively related to
SBLA for both MSA banks and non-MSA banks, but it is not significant in the non-MSA sample.
For urban community banks a higher Herfindahl index in their home market is likely due to
dominance of that market by large banks and hence, the negative coefficient on HERF suggests
fewer profitable lending opportunities for community banks in concentrated urban markets.  The
MSA results are consistent with Boot and Thakor’s (2000) finding that interbank competition
increases the amount of relationship lending by banks.
Overall, the results of the first stage model are more consistent with the alternative
hypothesis than they are with the hypothesis that community banks’ small business loans are
constrained by their funds. For community banks in non-MSA counties we fail to find a
significant relationship between small business loans and deposits. Moreover, the behavior of the
proxies for competing uses of funds is more consistent with a hypothesis that the lack of good
lending opportunities constrains small business lending than with the presence of funding
constraints.  Thus the community banks are constrained more by the demand side of the market
for loans, and not by the supply of funds. Hence, these results support the presence of alternative
uses of funds and reject the constrained funds explanation for lower levels of small business
loans.
System in Rates of Change
The results for deposits and lending in levels, equations (1) and (2), provide us with the
empirical relationship between the share of assets funded with deposits and the level of
investment in (portfolio share of) small business loans. This, however, is a static view of the
lending process and an indirect test of the funding constraint hypothesis. A more direct test of the
null hypothesis is to look at the change in small business lending over time as it relates to
changes in other balance sheet variables. To this end we estimate the same equations in rates of
change (our equations (3) and (4) above) over the same sample breakdowns as before.  As with
our first system of equations, for the small business lending equation (equation 4) the data reject
pooling the non-MSA community bank sample with the MSA community bank sample.
19
The top panel in table 3 presents the results for the change in deposit regressions. As
expected, the signs on the alternative funding sources variables – change in capital, change in
federal funds purchased and change in other borrowed money – are negative and significant for
                                                          
19 For equation 4 the data also reject the pooling of the non-MSA community bank sample with the non-
MSA large bank sample.13
both samples. Moreover, the effect of asset growth on deposits as is positive and significant for
this group of banks.  On the other hand, the negative and significant coefficient on deposit
market share at t-1 for rural community banks conforms to our expectation that banks with a high
deposit market shares will have difficulty increasing their deposits at or above the rate of deposit
growth in the market. The insignificant coefficient on deposit market share for city community
banks is consistent with this explanation.
The lower panel of table 3 presents the results for equation (4). From table 3 we see that
the coefficients on change in deposits and change in capital are not significantly different from
zero for the ‘MSA Banks’ and the ‘Non MSA Banks’ regressions. For both samples, the change
in the other uses of funds variables – change in large business loans, change in securities, and
change in federal funds sold – are significantly negatively related to the change in small business
loans. The magnitude of these effects is significantly larger for the rural community banks than
for those headquartered in MSAs. Especially noteworthy is the coefficient on change in
securities, which is nearly four times larger in absolute value for the non-MSA community banks
than for their urban counterparts. The most likely explanation for this result is a lack of profitable
small business lending opportunities in their home markets. In other words, community banks
rely on asset management to accommodate changes in loan demand, and in this case the demand
for small business loans. The absence of any effects of funding on the change in small business
loans and evidence that loan demand is accommodated through pure asset management is strong
evidence against our null hypothesis.
Finally, the change in small business loans is significantly positively related to asset
growth and the number of branches at t-1 for MSA and non-MSA community banks, and is
significantly negatively related to the deposit market Herfindahl at t-1 for rural community
banks. The positive and significant coefficient on the change in assets for both MSA and non-
MSA community banks suggests that for banks that are growing, the rate of growth in the small
business loan portfolios exceeds asset growth. In addition, the positive coefficient on the number
of branches at t-1 points to the importance of branches as a real option to develop the
relationships needed to profitably engage in small business lending. To the extent that a deposit
market concentration measure captures the competitiveness of the market, the insignificant
coefficient on the deposit market Herfindahl at t-1 for urban community banks and the
significantly negative coefficient on this Herfindahl index for rural community banks suggests
that monopoly power reduces the change in small business loans. Finally, the performance of the14
economic conditions proxies is consistent with the need to control for fixed effects in these
regressions.
Overall, the results of our empirical tests find little evidence to supporting the null
hypothesis. Our models of small business lending fail to find a significant relationship between
deposits and small business loans in both the share/level regressions and the change regressions.
Moreover, we find evidence of asset management by community banks, especially those
headquartered in non-MSA counties, to accommodate changes in loan demand.
IV. Conclusion and Policy Implications
The enhancement of FHLB lending authority to include small enterprise loans by
community financial institutions appears to have little economic justification. Three possible
rationales for Congress including this FHLB reform in GBLA are outlined and investigated
including: the desire to subsidize community banks, the need to mitigate moral hazard incentives
associated with an increasingly nonviable GSE, and the need to correct a market failure in the
small business lending markets. We argue that the first two possible objectives could be
addressed through measures that are less distortionary and hence less costly to society. We
formally test the third possible objective.
Our empirical analysis of the small business lending activities of community banks fails
to find any evidence of funding constraints – the presumed source of market failure. The results,
however, are consistent with community banks in non-MSA counties having more funds
available than they can profitably lend. In fact, we find strong evidence that these banks utilize
pure asset management to accommodate changes in loan demand. Therefore, it is unlikely that
the GBLA’s extension of FHLB lending authority to include advances secured by the small
enterprise portfolios of community banks and thrifts will materially increase small enterprise
lending.
This new selective credit allocation scheme is likely to have costs, however. Stojanovic
et al. (2000) show how FHLB advances could lead to increased risk-taking by community
financial institutions and hence, increased loss exposure to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.  Maloney and Thomson (2001) point out the implications of extending FHLB
lending authority for the riskiness of the FHLBs and the consequent increased risk to taxpayers.
In addition, to the extent that these advances are used by community financial institutions for
deposit replacement, the effect of this selective credit allocation scheme will be to subsidize15
community banks at the expense of depositors.
20
                                                          
20 This is eerily reminiscent of the policies adopted in the 1960s to stabilize the thrift industry.  See Kane
(1970).16
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TABLE 2:  Banks with Total Assets < $500 million
Dependent Variable: MSA Banks   Non MSA Banks
Deposits to assets Parameter      Parameter   
  Estimate t value Prob > |t|   Estimate t value Prob > |t|
Intercept 0.955704 183.28 <.0001  0.982724 277.49 <.0001
Capital to assets -0.993300 -151.19 <.0001  -0.936240 -175.53 <.0001
Fed Funds purchased to assets -0.000004 -111.64 <.0001  -0.000005 -93.78 <.0001
Other borrowed money to assets -0.000004 -85.71 <.0001  -0.000005 -61.95 <.0001
Natural log of assets to assets 18.71987 13.43 <.0001  12.81665 16.89 <.0001
Number of branches 0.001060 12.40 <.0001  0.001272 14.10 <.0001
Deposit market share 0.038970 4.25 <.0001  0.000861 1.29 0.1959
Unemployment rate 0.001332 12.05 <.0001  0.000405 6.24 <.0001
Population growth rate 0.001286 5.69 <.0001  0.000147 1.22 0.2218
Natural log of per capita income 0.003274 2.19 0.0289  -0.005360 -4.76 <.0001
R-Square 0.71449      0.66076    
Number of observations 17734      23065    
Root-MSE 0.02949      0.02520   
Dependent  Mean 0.87685      0.87292   
Coefficient of variation 3.363       2.887    
Dependent Variable: MSA Banks   Non MSA Banks
Small business loans to assets Parameter      Parameter    
  Estimate t value Prob > |t|   Estimate t value Prob > |t|
Intercept 0.01215 0.54 0.5922  0.25349 10.05 <.0001
Deposits to assets 0.15946 8.36 <.0001  -0.14518 -6.30 <.0001
Capital to assets 0.24699 9.45 <.0001  -0.23577 -9.19 <.0001
Large business loans to assets -0.71922 -153.85 <.0001  -0.48397 -115.14 <.0001
Securities to assets -0.69100 -124.41 <.0001  -0.42046 -92.07 <.0001
Fed Funds sold to assets -0.58757 -45.15 <.0001  -0.33597 -28.23 <.0001
Natural log of assets to assets -150.709 -38.76 <.0001  -99.353 -48.02 <.0001
Number of branches -0.00131 -5.81 <.0001  0.00388 16.05 <.0001
Deposit Herfindahl -0.01737 -1.79 0.0731  -0.00306 -1.51 0.1301
Unemployment rate 0.00407 13.07 <.0001  0.00525 28.98 <.0001
Population growth rate -0.00229 -3.64 0.0003  0.00932 27.74 <.0001
Natural log of per capita income 0.14169 36.77 <.0001  0.08682 28.05 <.0001
R-Square 0.66114      0.47305    
Number of observations 17734      23065    
Root-MSE 0.08121      0.06906   
Dependent  Mean 0.16119      0.06363   
Coefficient of variation 50.382       108.539    
Source:  Authors' calculations.20
TABLE 3:  Banks with Total Assets < $500 million
Dependent Variable: MSA Banks   Non MSA Banks
LN ∆ in Deposits Parameter      Parameter   
  Estimate t value Prob > |t|   Estimate t value Prob > |t|
Intercept 0.016209 1.91 0.0556  0.004949 1.28 0.2014
LN ∆ in Capital -0.095700 -43 <.0001  -0.109600 -62.99 <.0001
LN ∆ in Fed Funds Purchased -0.005060 -27.09 <.0001  -0.004720 -44.54 <.0001
LN ∆ in Other Borrowed Money -0.002980 -19.14 <.0001  -0.002980 -31.07 <.0001
LN ∆ in Assets 1.114282 407.57 <.0001  1.105859 541.88 <.0001
Number of Branches at t-1 -0.000390 -2.7 0.0069  -0.000420 -4.26 <.0001
Deposit market share at t-1 -0.025470 -1.6 0.1088  -0.001230 -1.73 0.0842
Unemployment rate -0.000070 -0.33 0.7379  -0.000002 -0.03 0.9745
Population growth rate 0.000668 1.74 0.0817  0.000025 0.19 0.8482
Natural log of per capita income -0.006130 -2.47 0.0135  -0.002230 -1.78 0.0756
R-Square 0.94547      0.96186    
Number of observations 11946      14860    
Root-MSE 0.0405      0.0229    
Dependent Mean 0.10081       0.05996    
Coefficient of variation 40.144       38.143    
Dependent Variable: MSA Banks   Non MSA Banks
LN ∆ Small Business Loans Parameter      Parameter   
  Estimate t value Prob > |t|   Estimate t value Prob > |t|
Intercept 1.878172 3.77 0.0002  1.611482 4.39 <.0001
LN ∆ in Deposits 1.580852 0.84 0.4012  1.864857 1.04 0.2962
LN ∆ in Capital -0.092940 -0.41 0.6817  0.179091 0.71 0.4775
LN ∆ Large Business Loans -6.012720 -92.62 <.0001  -9.966840 -144.55 <.0001
LN ∆ in Securities -0.453030 -9.01 <.0001  -1.769010 -25.79 <.0001
LN ∆ in Fed Funds Sold -0.246320 -12.75 <.0001  -0.290300 -19.22 <.0001
LN ∆ in Assets 6.483612 3.1 0.0019  10.360230 5.28 <.0001
Number of Branches at t-1 0.017053 2.01 0.0449  0.030358 3.33 0.0009
Deposit Herfindahl at t-1 -0.379070 -1.02 0.3075  -0.192580 -2.44 0.0148
Unemployment rate -0.029220 -2.38 0.0175  -0.032210 -4.56 <.0001
Population growth rate 0.079153 3.31 0.0009  0.004008 0.32 0.7498
Natural log of per capita income -0.432920 -2.99 0.0028  -0.318250 -2.69 0.0071
R-Square 0.42119      0.58629    
Number of observations 11946       14860    
Root-MSE 2.5208      2.1691    
Dependent Mean 0.63246       0.38874    
Coefficient of variation 398.572       557.975    
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